The Flashpoint at Home: What the Israel-Iran Conflict — and now U.S. Involvement — Means for American Policing in the Near Future

In the early morning hours of June 21-22, 2025, American B-2 bombers entered the airspace above Iran and, using specialized munitions, obliterated three key nuclear facilities. As a result, yet another global shift began – not just in the Middle East, but in communities across the United States. What began as an Israeli campaign to degrade Iran’s nuclear capability has now become a high-stakes geopolitical confrontation involving direct U.S. military force. With President Trump declaring the strikes a “spectacular success,” and Iranian leaders vowing revenge, the ripple effects may be about to wash ashore – literally and figuratively – on American soil.

This may not turn out to a war being fought exclusively “over there.” The implications of the Israel-Iran conflict, especially with American intervention, will soon make themselves felt in our economy, our communities, and most critically for police leaders – our streets.

Police chiefs, sheriffs, city managers, and elected officials must recognize this moment for what it is: a flashpoint. And with the Fourth of July rapidly approaching, there’s little time to waste.

A Conflict that Could Impact Every American Community

Before examining the implications for policing in terms of an economic downturn, community unrest or domestic terrorism, it’s important to understand the conflict’s implications for every American.

Iran has promised retaliation for the U.S. airstrikes. Some analysts believe this may include blocking the Strait of Hormuz – through which one-fifth of the world’s oil supply flows. Even without a full blockade, instability in the region will likely send oil prices climbing, with analysts forecasting that crude could soon surge past $100 per barrel if the situation escalates.

That translates directly to economic strain at home. Higher fuel costs will ripple across supply chains, food prices rise, and inflation may spike – triggering anxiety, resentment, and hardship among working-class Americans. This is on top of the current uncertainty of U.S. imposed tariffs. Combined, the potential decrease in local sales tax revenue will undoubtedly have an impact on many police agency’s FY 2025-26 budget and possibly into the 2026-27 fiscal year. In turn, this will undoubtedly affect police recruitment and hiring.

Historically, periods of economic stress – especially when tied to international conflict – have also been the impetus for domestic unrest. Witness the 2020 Covid/police reform demonstrations, the protests against the Iraq War in the early 2000s and the gas protests during the 1970s oil crisis. Policing must be prepared for angry, frustrated, and scared people expressing this stress through increased domestic disturbances and mass demonstrations.

Demonstrations in the Streets – and the Perfect Storm of Dual Grievance

If the anti-war protests that have just begun gain momentum, with people expressing opposition to U.S. military action in Iran, they ae likely to converge with another national powder keg: anger over the ongoing, aggressive deportation tactics used by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), especially in sanctuary jurisdictions.

In cities like Los Angeles, New York, and San Francisco, local officials have been battling federal authorities over ICE raids that are being carried out in neighborhoods, workplaces, and schools. Community outrage over these actions has been rapidly building, and the optics of American military forces now attacking Iran may ignite a broader, unified protest movement.

We are entering what might be called a “dual grievance moment.” Mass demonstrations are likely to center on opposition to war abroad and perceived injustice at. Most of these demonstrations will likely be peaceful. But as we’ve seen repeatedly over the past decade, the line between peaceful protest and civil unrest can be razor thin. Add to this mix “professional,” violent agitators with their own agendas and the images of police use of force will soon lead the nightly news.

Police departments must resist the temptation to over-militarize their response to peaceful protestors. Instead, they should employ the “best practices” of current public order maintenance thinking, reinforcing trust, and using force as a last resort.

That means:

• Coordinating with protest organizers, where possible, to set expectations and reduce conflict.

• Training officers in protest engagement, civil rights protections, engaging in dialogue with protestors, and the optics of presence.

• Avoiding unnecessary heavy-handedness that can escalate tensions, such as indiscriminate use of tear gas or less-lethal munitions.

It also means preparing for counter-protests. Pro-Israel groups, veterans’ organizations, and other politically active communities will likely take to the streets in support of the U.S. position. That increases the likelihood of physical confrontations – especially in politically divided cities. Policing must prepare for this volatile mix.

The Threat of Sleeper Cells

While the public and media focus primarily on visible protests or rising prices, perhaps the most chilling possibility in this rapidly evolving conflict is the one no one wants to think about: a domestic terrorist attack by Iranian-backed sleeper cells already in the U.S.

The Fourth of July, long a symbolic date of American pride and unity, is now also a symbolic date of American vulnerability. The convergence of open-air patriotic events, mass gatherings, and a simmering global conflict makes it an attractive target for asymmetric actors looking to make a statement. And remember, Iran’s leaders have vowed violent retribution for the airstrikes.

This concern is not just speculative. U.S. intelligence experts have publicly acknowledged Iran’s long-term strategy of asymmetric warfare, which includes embedding operatives or cultivating sympathizers within target nations for potential activation during times of heightened conflict. According to media reporting and assessments by U.S. intelligence agencies and terrorism experts, Iranian proxy networks have previously conducted surveillance on American targets, including synagogues, Israeli consulates, and high-profile political figures. One can only imagine the purpose of that surveillance.

The intent behind such sleeper cells is clear: in the event of open conflict or an attack against Iran, these assets can be activated to conduct coordinated attacks meant to inflict mass casualties, disrupt civil society, and provoke further polarization of America. And as always, the first responders to such incidents will be local cops.

Terrorist targets are likely to fall into five broad categories:

Jewish institutions and synagogues

As both symbolic and ideological targets, Jewish cultural centers, schools, and places of worship are likely at elevated risk. Iran views Israel and its allies as part of a shared adversary, and proxies have historically targeted Jewish facilities globally.

Political figures and government buildings

Members of Congress, especially those who support Israeli defense policy, as well as state-level officials, could be targeted for assassination or intimidation. The police should not discount the potential for attacks on soft political targets, such as town halls or campaign events.

Critical infrastructure

Targets like power substations, water treatment facilities, rail hubs, and telecommunications networks are vulnerable to both physical sabotage and cyber-attacks. A coordinated strike could cause regional blackouts, disrupt emergency communications, or impair transportation systems – paralyzing local response capabilities.

Public gatherings and holidays

Events tied to national pride – like the upcoming Fourth of July celebrations – are especially attractive to those seeking maximum impact. Outdoor concerts, parades, and fireworks displays could be exploited by attackers using vehicle ramming, small arms fire, or improvised explosives.

Symbolic civilian soft targets

High-occupancy public venues such as shopping malls, movie theaters, or sports arenas are favored in asymmetric warfare because they provoke fear and disrupt everyday life. The goal is psychological: to make Americans feel unsafe in familiar places.

Compounding this risk is the difficulty of detection. Sleeper cells do not behave like traditional organized criminal gangs. They may live in seemingly quiet suburban neighborhoods, operate under deep cover, and use encrypted communications or couriers to avoid surveillance. Some may not even know they are part of a coordinated network until triggered by a signal from abroad.

For policing, this threat poses profound operational and ethical challenges:

• Resource allocation: Agencies must decide how to apportion limited personnel between visible protest control and invisible counterterror work.

• Community trust: Muslim-American and Middle Eastern communities are likely to experience increased scrutiny – fair or not. Police agencies must avoid repeating the errors of post-9-11 overreach, which damaged trust and cooperation with communities vital to stopping real threats.

• Interagency coordination: Local policing cannot manage this risk alone. It requires a real-time intelligence sharing relationship with federal partners like the FBI, DHS, and regional fusion centers.

Police leaders must also be cautious not to conflate legitimate political dissent with national security threats. The presence of sleeper cells is a national concern, but the preservation of constitutional rights during times of crisis is a fundamental policing responsibility.

As the Fourth of July rapidly approaches, police leaders should conduct vulnerability assessments for all major public events, coordinate with faith-based organizations – especially Jewish institutions – and ensure contingency plans for mass casualty response are current and drilled.

This is not alarmism. It’s readiness. Because the success of sleeper cell strategies depends not only on the attack itself – but on how society reacts. Policing’s job is to respond with speed, courage, and an unshakable commitment to protect all of the public, without giving in to fear or bias.

What Should Police Agencies Do?

This is not a time for panic—but it is a time for strategic readiness. Police agencies must pivot now toward enhanced protection of soft targets and community trust-building. Here are five suggestions the police can implement to enhance community safety:

1. Harden Soft Targets

• Work with Jewish institutions, faith groups, and community organizations to ensure security assessments are up to date.

• Increase visible patrols and undercover presence at known high-risk locations –particularly on and around July 4th.

• Collaborate with DHS fusion centers for real-time intelligence on threats and indicators of sleeper activity.

2. Increase Intelligence Sharing

• Chiefs and sheriffs should connect immediately with regional FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) and update protocols for responding to potential insider threats.

• Leverage digital forensics and local tip lines – encouraging communities to report suspicious activity without fear of profiling.

3. Train for a Multi-Event Threat

• Agencies should be prepared for the possibility of multiple, simultaneous incidents—even if small scale.

• That includes active shooter events, firebombings, and coordinated hoaxes designed to stretch law enforcement thin.

4. Communicate Proactively

• Silence in moments like this breeds fear and conspiracy.

• Police leaders should issue clear, calm messaging to their communities that the police are aware, alert, and engaged.

• Community policing teams should engage faith leaders, immigrant advocacy groups, and neighborhood associations before something tragic happens.

5. Review Contingency Plans

• Departments should dust off and revise mass casualty and multi-hazard incident plans.

• Use Fourth of July event planning as an opportunity to drill interagency coordination, mass notification systems, and emergency response timelines.

The Lone Actor Threat

While sleeper cells pose a structured and coordinated threat, an equally dangerous and often more unpredictable risk may come from radicalized, pro-Iranian lone actors. These individuals may not be formally connected to the Iranian regime or its proxy networks, but they are ideologically aligned – and increasingly motivated by U.S. military actions in the Middle East.

This is an increasingly prevalent aspect of asymmetric warfare: where political ideology, religious grievance, or perceived injustice becomes a trigger for violence in individuals who are inspired, rather than directed, by foreign powers.

Why Lone Actors Are So Dangerous

Unlike sleeper cells, which may require years of preparation, encryption, and logistical coordination, lone actors can emerge quickly and operate invisibly. They often radicalize online, consume propaganda materials through encrypted apps or fringe platforms, and take action with minimal planning – sometimes using legally obtained firearms, vehicles, or improvised weapons.

Recent events that could serve as radicalization catalysts include:

• The U.S. bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities, which may be framed as an attack on Islam or national sovereignty by pro-Iranian propagandists.

• Heightened media coverage of U.S. – Israel collaboration, which may inflame anti-Zionist and anti-American sentiment.

• Anti-Muslim rhetoric or hate crimes in the U.S., which can be perceived as justification for retaliatory “defensive” violence by extremists.

Targets may include the same kinds of soft locations threatened by sleeper cells:

• Jewish synagogues and cultural centers

• Pro-Israel demonstrations or gatherings

• Government buildings or elected officials seen as “responsible”

• Public July 4th events or other patriotic gatherings

• Media outlets or journalists viewed as hostile to Iran or Islam

These actors may leave little, if any, digital trail, making interdiction nearly impossible through traditional intelligence methods. They may also display signs of mental illness, compounding the difficulty in distinguishing between ideologically driven intent and general instability.

What Police Can Do About Lone Actor Threats

Responding to the lone actor threat requires a combination of community engagement, early detection, and rapid tactical response – all within a framework that respects civil liberties.

Community Trust and Reporting

The best defense against lone actors is a well-informed and empowered public. Family members, friends, coworkers, and religious communities are often the first to see warning signs. Police departments should:

• Reiterate the “See Something, Say Something” ethos through community briefings and social media campaigns.

• Engage directly with mosques, cultural centers, and immigrant communities – not as suspects, but as partners in public safety.

• Provide clear, non-threatening ways for people to report concerns anonymously.

Threat Assessment Teams

Many departments already operate behavioral threat assessment teams. These should be expanded or reinforced with:

• Training on ideologically motivated violence, including the unique dynamics of Middle Eastern political/religious ideologies.

• Access to open-source intelligence tools to monitor public discourse around key events (e.g., bombing anniversaries, religious holidays).

• Coordination with mental health professionals and federal agencies to balance first amendment protections with actionable risk.

Event Hardening and Target Profiling

As with sleeper cell threats, large gatherings and symbolic locations must receive heightened attention. For example:

• July 4th events should include undercover officers, EOD teams, canine units, and drone surveillance where legally permitted.

• High-risk sites – especially synagogues, Jewish community centers, and Israeli diplomatic facilities – should be offered proactive security audits and increased patrol visibility.

• Local police should maintain direct lines with Fusion Centers and Joint Terrorism Task Forces to flag individuals or trends before an incident occurs.

Training and Scenario Planning

Officers need realistic, current training that reflects the lone actor threat. Police leaders should consider incorporating:

• Tabletop exercises simulating mass casualty attacks by lone actors.

• Interdisciplinary training with fire/EMS and emergency management for rapid scene containment.

• Reviews of past incidents to understand tactics, timelines, and lessons learned.

Messaging and Public Reassurance

During times of geopolitical tension, fear spreads quickly. Police leaders should be visible, transparent, and calming voices in their communities. This includes:

• Regular briefings with local media and community partners.

• Clearly communicated threat levels, response protocols, and protective measures in place.

• Emphasis on the difference between ideologically motivated actors and peaceful community members from affected regions or faiths.

Lone actors are among the most difficult threats to prevent – and the most likely to emerge when global conflict stirs local passions. Policing cannot afford to ignore this aspect of the threat spectrum. While it’s impossible to predict every incident, the police can prepare systems, inform communities, and train officers to respond swiftly, ethically, and effectively.

Because the threat may come not from a foreign agent crossing borders, but from a neighbor whose ideology has quietly turned deadly.

Final Thoughts

In our increasingly interconnected and uncertain world, war is rarely contained. The U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear sites may have occurred 6,000 miles away, but the consequences may soon be knocking on the doors of American cities and towns.

For police leaders, the mission is twofold: prepare for the known risks of mass protests and possible terror and preserve the vital public trust that keeps communities resilient in times of crisis. Let this be the moment American policing proves that it is both ready and principled. Because history will not ask if we were afraid. It will ask if we were prepared – and how the police served the communities they are paid to protect.

About the Author

Jim Bueermann has been actively involved in policing for almost 50 years. He is a retired police chief, president of the National Police Foundation (now the National Policing Institute) and is currently the President of the Future Policing Institute and its Center on Policing and Artificial Intelligence. To read his full bio click here.